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Abstract
This study explores the relation between pain sensitivity and 
the cognitive processing of words. 130 participants evaluated 
the pain-relatedness of a total of 600 two-syllabic nouns, and 
subsequently reported on their own pain sensitivity. The 
results demonstrate that pain-sensitive people (based on their 
self-report) associate words more strongly with pain than less 
sensitive people. In particular, concrete nouns like syringe, 
wound, knife, and cactus, are considered to  be more pain-
related for those who are more pain-sensitive. We discuss our 
results in the light of three theoretical frameworks – cognitive 
bias, prototype theory, embodied account. We argue that the 
latter is best suited to explain the results of this study in the 
sense in which it implies the principle of body specificity, 
according to which different bodily characteristics lead to 
corresponding differences in  the way in which people 
construct concepts and word meanings.
Keywords: Pain, pain-sensitivity; semantic processing; 
cognitive biases; prototype theory;  embodied account; body 
specificity.
Introduction
The last few decades have amassed data on the influence of 
affective states like emotions and pain on semantic 
processes, but also the reverse influence of semantic 
processes on the perception of emotional and painful 
stimuli. E.g.,  Dillmann et al. (2000) investigated the effects 
of different semantic primes on the processing of painful 
stimuli; using a sentence completion task, Rusu et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that participants with pain and depression 
exhibit a cognitive bias specific to negative aspects of 
health; Niedenthal et al. (1997) provide evidence that being 
in an emotional state facilitates responses to words 
categorically associated with that emotion. More recently, 
researchers have also focused on the impact of emotional 
sensitivity on the cognitive processing of emotion words. 
Instead of inducing certain emotions to test whether and 
how strongly cognitive processes are inhibited or facilitated 
while undergoing certain emotions, researchers have 
investigated the importance of people’s emotional 
sensitivity for specific cognitive tasks. E.g. Silva et al. 
(2012) have found that sensitivity to disgust affects lexical 
decision performance; Rak et al. (2013) show that people’s 
ability to feel empathy with others exerts an influence on the 
integration of emotion words. Despite these advances in the 
study of emotions, little research has been devoted to 
questions regarding the relation between the semantic 
processing of words on the one hand, and pain sensitivity on 
the other, where pain sensitivity is generally assumed to 
refer to subjects’ responsiveness to noxious stimuli. Our 
study intends to fill this lacuna.
Three theoretical frameworks have often been drawn 
upon to account for individual differences regarding the 
language processing of pain-related or emotion-related 
stimuli. (1) Cognitive bias: Subjects with different 
inclinations, tendencies, etc. will show cognitive biases 
towards stimuli that are in accordance with their 
inclinations. E.g., studies with healthy subjects showed that 
individuals, who are more pain sensitive, are also more 
strongly engaged with pain-related stimuli (Baum et al., 
2011). (2) Prototype Analysis: According to prototype 
theory, conceptual representations are encoded in a 
prototypical fashion and consist of various features, some of 
which are more central than others (Sloman et al., 1998), 
e.g. having a sharp tip is more central to the concept of a 
nail than having a silver colour.  The degree of centrality of 
the features of conceptual representations, however,  varies 
between different people given the different exposure to 
examplars of a certain concept. Thus,  differences in the 
semantic processing of pain-related words need to take into 
account the inter-individual differences in which concepts 
are stored. (3) Embodied Cognition: the processing of 
linguistic meaning essentially involves perceptual, motoric 
and emotional brain regions corresponding to the contents 
of the words to be comprehended. E.g. Richter et al. (2010) 
have shown that when people are presented with pain 
words, there is substantial activity in the pain matrix that is 
also active when people feel a pain. The activation of these 
brain regions during semantic processing has been taken as 
evidence of the fact that reading words “hurts”.  This finding 
opens the way to the fascinating issue of whether people 
show individual differences in the degree to which they are 
hurt by words.  According to the body specificity hypothesis 
(Casasanto, 2011) they should: if concepts and word 
meanings are at least partially constituted by implicit 
simulations of bodily experiences, as stated by the 
supporters of the embodied account, then individual 
differences in the way in which people experience the world 
should lead to corresponding differences in the way in 
which they construct concepts and word meanings.The 
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primary aim of our study was to investigate the hitherto 
unexplored question of whether individual differences in 
pain sensitivity, as measured by people’s self-report, have a 
substantial influence on the cognitive processing of words, 
as measured by people’s ratings of the pain-relatedness of 
words. We were also particularly interested in whether pain 
sensitivity has a differential influence on the processing of 
abstract vs. concrete nouns. After presenting the experiment 
in the next section, we will discuss our results in light of the 
theories that we mentioned above. Collecting people’s 
evaluations of the pain-relatedness of words, our secondary 
aim was to build a large database of pain-related words, 
which could be later used by researchers interested in the 




189 participants took part in our survey. We only collected 
responses from those 141 participants who completed the 
survey. 10 further subjects had to be excluded from our 
analysis because they were not German native speakers, and 
data of another subject had to be dismissed because the 
person stopped responding differentially after 25% of the 
words were presented. Of the remaining 130 people, 70 
were female,  18 years or older, with a mean age of 28.04 
years (SD = 8.97). All subjects who participated in our 
survey were recruited through the Ruhr University Bochum 
and were mostly students. They were not reimbursed for 
their participation, but among all participants who submitted 
their email address, four book vouchers were drawn.
Stimuli
We assembled a list of 330 German pain words. All words 
were two-syllabic nouns and fell roughly into three 
categories: (A) nouns that refer to objects, the use of or 
contact with which, may be associated with having pain,  e.g. 
thorn (Dorne), hail (Hagel), hammer (Hammer), crutch 
(Krücken), tank (Panzer), snake (Schlange), shard 
(Scherbe). (B) nouns that refer to body parts or inflictions of 
body parts that are often associated with having pain, e.g. 
appendix (Blinddarm), pus (Eiter), neck (Genick), bone 
(Knochen), scar (Narbe). (C) abstract nouns that refer to 
states of affairs that often involve being in pain, e.g. birth 
(Geburt), emergency (Notfall), epidemic (Seuche), torture 
(Folter).  We then supplemented this list with 270 two-
syllabic nouns of which 90 words have a positive valence, 
e.g. eagle (Adler), spring (Frühjahr), saphire (Saphir), 90 
words with neutral valence, e.g. herring (Hering), 
magnifying glass (Lupe),  pendulum (Pendel), and 90 words 
with a negative valence but presumably not pain-related, 
e.g. wrinkle (Falte), race (Rasse), spy (Spion). Whereas the 
pain-relatedness of the 330 “pain-words” was not 
independently determined (as far as we know, no similar list 
has so far been assembled),  the 270 additional words were 
randomly selected from the Berlin Affective Word List (Võ 
et al., 2009). 
Procedure
The list of 600 words was divided into six surveys including 
100 words (55 pain-related nouns, 15 positive, 15 neutral 
and 15 negative nouns were randomly put together).  Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of the six surveys 
that they filled out using the survey platform kwiksurvey. 
Before they were presented with the list of words,  they were 
informed that they would be asked to rate the physical pain 
that they associate with that concept.  After reading each 
word x, the person was asked to answer the question “How 
strongly do you associate a x with pain?” (Wie stark 
assoziieren Sie ein(e) x mit Schmerzen?) on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all,  2 = slightly, 3 = medium, 4 = strongly, 5 
= very strongly). Figure 1 depicts the mean values for each 
of the 600 words that were evaluated during the study. The 
average rating for all words and all subjects was 2.37 (SD = 
0.99).
Figure 1: Mean values for all 600 presented words.
After evaluating 100 words, participants were prompted 
to provide demographical data on age, gender, and mother 
tongue. Subsequently, they were asked to self-assess their 
pain sensitivity: Would you consider yourself to be pain 
sensitive? (Würden Sie sich als schmerzempfindlich 
bezeichnen?). Possible responses were: (a) yes, (b) not so 
much (c) definitely not, and (d) I don’t know. While a 
person’s pain sensitivity is usually assessed in the laboratory 
setting using controlled experimental stimuli in a number of 
stimulus modalities, such as heat, cold and pressure, it has 
been shown that the use of self-reports to assess pain 
sensitivity is a viable means (Ruscheweyh et al, 2009, 2011, 
but see Edwards (2007)). We furthermore asked subjects to 
report on the frequency with which they feel pain. How 
often do you experience pain? (Wie oft haben Sie 
Schmerzen?).  Possible responses were (a) very rarely (b) 
now and then, (c) quite often, (d) chronic pain. The 




Average values for participant’s ratings of the pain-
relatedness of all 600 nouns are depicted in Figure 2. 
Participants were divided into three groups (High (N=31), 
Moderate (N=78), Low (N=12)) depending on their self-
assessment of their pain sensitivity (see Procedure above).  1 
In order to analyze the influence of self-assessed Pain 
Sensitivity on people’s mean Rating, we applied an ANOVA 
with participants’ Rating as the dependent measure.
Figure 2: Effect of pain sensitivity on average pain-ratings.
There was a significant main effect of Pain Sensitivity,  F
(2,120) = 3.813, p = .025. A LSD post-hoc test revealed 
significant differences between the High and Moderate 
group (p=.023) as well as between High and Low (p=.018) 
but no significant result between Moderate and Low (p=.
293). 
Comparison ‘Pain-Words’ vs. Random Nouns 
We divided the list of words into those that were preselected 
as being likely to be associated with pain, so called pain-
words,  and those that were randomly selected to 
complement the list (see also Stimuli section). All average 
values are displayed in Figure 3. Regardless of pain 
sensitivity, pain-related words are evaluated to be more 
strongly associated with pain, 2.87 (SE = .15), compared to 
control words, 1.88 (SE = .14).  We ran two ANOVAs for 
‘pain-words’ and for controls with independent factor Pain 
Sensitivity (High, Moderate, Low), and participant’s rating 
as the dependent measure: Whereas Pain Sensitivity has a 
significant effect on the evaluations when only pain words 
are considered, (F(2,120) = 3,786 p = .025), no significant 
effect was obtained for the group of random words (F 
(2,120) = 1.216, p = 0.300). 
Figure 3: Comparing pain-words with control words.
Abstract vs. Concrete Nouns
Participants were presented with both concrete pain-related 
nouns, e.g. syringe, cactus, but also abstract pain-related 
nouns, e.g. birth, emergency. Given the divergent 
predictions different theories make regarding the processing 
of abstract and concrete nouns (see Discussion), we were 
particularly interested in whether there is any difference 
between people’s ratings of abstract and concrete words.2 
The mean values are depicted in Figure 4. The average 
value of ratings for abstract nouns is considerable higher, 
3.27 (SE = .17, compared to concrete nouns, 2.64 (SE = .
14). While there is a highly significant result for concrete 
nouns, F(2,120) = 5.048, p = .008, no significant result 
could be obtained for people’s ratings on abstract nouns, F
(2,120) = 1.618, p = .203. We also analyzed whether 
abstract words that were not strongly associated with pain 
show a significant difference with regards to people’s pain 
sensitivity. An ANOVA that was performed on 60 less pain-
related words demonstrates that no such influence seems to 
exist. F(2,120) = 1.401, p = .250).
1 Only 12 people evaluated their pain sensitivity as low. This can be explained by the actual wording of the response options. 
Arguably, fewer people are willing to state that they do not consider themselves to be pain sensitive than having a low pain 
sensitivity. Nine subjects, who claimed not to know whether they were pain sensitive, were excluded from statistical analysis.
2  To test the influence of concept type on people’s pain rating we used 108 abstract words and 190 concrete words. We 
deliberately excluded all concepts that have both conrete and abstract features, e.g. tyrant, foul.
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Figure 4: Abstract vs. Concrete Nouns
Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to determine whether 
pain sensitivity has an influence on the semantic processing 
of pain-related words. In order to test this hypothesis, we 
compared measures of subjects’ self-reported pain 
sensitivity with their evaluation of the pain-relatedness of 
words. Our results confirmed that pain sensitivity has a 
significant impact on the rating of pain-related words. 
People who reported to be more sensitive to pain produced 
higher pain ratings to pain-related words compared to 
people who reported to be less sensitive. 
This finding stimulates a series of interesting 
considerations. First of all, while the relation between the 
processing of pain-related information and other cognitive 
factors has been investigated, the notion of pain-related 
words has been generally operationalized using stimulus 
material that describes the sensory qualities of pain (e.g., 
words like ‘‘stabbing’’, ‘‘burning’’) or its affective 
component (e.g., words like ‘‘annoying’’, ‘‘terrifying’’). In 
our experiment we provide evidence, for the first time, of 
the relation between pain sensitivity and the processing of 
nouns which can be contextually related to painful situations 
but do not explicitly describe pain. This suggests that the 
individual variable pain-sensitivity might affect the 
processing of pain-related information to a much greater 
extent than previously thought.  Given the widespread nature 
of this phenomenon, the exploration of the possible 
mechanisms by which this interaction takes place deserves 
special attention. 
A potential interpretation of our results assumes a 
cognitive theory of pain. According to this account, the 
relation between pain sensitivity and the rating of pain-
related words is explained by cognitive biases in retrieval 
and processing of pain-related information. For example, 
biases to orient the attention towards pain-related stimuli or 
to form implicit or explicit pain-related memories could 
play a relevant role. The underlying assumption is that 
people who are highly pain-sensitive show attentional or 
memory biases towards pain-related stimuli compared to 
low-sensitive people, and these biases mediate their 
processing of pain-related words. A classical paradigm to 
test attentional biases adopts a Stroop task, in which people 
are presented with colored words and instructed to name the 
color while ignoring the meaning of the words. Slower 
answers in naming the color of pain-related words are taken 
to reveal of an attentional bias towards pain related 
information (Pearce and Morley, 1989). 
It has been recently shown that individuals who are 
attentionally more engaged with pain-related stimuli are also 
more pain-sensitive, as measured by experimental pain 
sensitivity (Baum et al., 2011). Thus, it could be argued that 
the results of our study are predicted by an attentional bias: 
people who are highly pain-sensitive would preferentially 
allocate their attention to pain-related words compared to 
people who are less sensitive, and would consequently 
produce higher ratings of pain-relatedness. It should be 
noted though that whereas attentional bias to pain stimuli 
has been extensively investigated, little is known about the 
emotional and behavioral correlates of attentional responses. 
It is not clear then that an attentional bias towards pain-
related stimuli would predict evaluations of higher pain-
relatedness of the presented words. Furthermore, a recent 
meta-analysis concluded that attentional bias towards pain-
related information is not a robust phenomenon given that it 
proved difficult to generate or replicate (Crombez et al., 
2013). 
An alternative explanation of how cognitive factors 
mediate between pain sensitivity and the rating of pain 
related words could be that individual differences in pain 
sensitivity affect the way in which people form concepts. 
This view is consistent with prototype theory which, unlike 
the classical account, predicts that concepts vary from one 
person to the next, based on individual experiences with 
exemplars of a certain category (Rosch, 1999). People who 
are more sensitive to pain would,  on this account,  record 
more often the occurrence of the attribute “painful” for 
experienced exemplars of a certain concept. Thus, this 
attribute is more likely to be integrated into their concepts as 
compared to the concepts of people who are less sensitive to 
pain. For example,  for high-pain-sensitive people, 
experiences with syringes will have in common the attribute 
of painfulness.  It follows that the central tendency and the 
representation of this range of experiences will include their 
painfulness,  that is, the property of being painful will 
become part of the prototypical representation of a syringe. 
Consequently, when high-pain-sensitive people are asked to 
evaluate the pain-relatedness of certain words,  the average 
value of their evaluations is predicted to be higher compared 
to the average value produced by people who are less pain 
sensitive. Interestingly, prototype theory makes also an 
additional prediction concerning the ratings of concrete and 
abstract words. The theory predicts an influence of pain-
sensitivity on word ratings also for abstract words given that 
also in this case the attribute “painful” is assumed to be 
more strongly integrated in the concepts of highly pain-
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sensitive people than in those of less sensitive people.  This 
prediction,  however, is at odds with our data, which 
confirmed a significant influence of pain sensitivity on word 
ratings only for concrete words. A supporter of prototype 
theory could object that in our experiment abstract words 
were on average rated to be more pain-related than concrete 
words. Thus,  the saliency of the attribute “painful” for 
abstract words would obfuscate any difference due to f pain-
sensitivity. If this reasoning were correct, we should expect 
to find a significant impact of pain-sensitivity on word 
ratings when considering only the sub-set of abstract words 
which were given low pain values.  However, this additional 
analysis did not reveal any significant result between pain-
sensitivity and abstract words, thus rejecting the prediction 
of prototype theory (see Results section). The latter then can 
only partially account for our results.
A third interpretation of the reported findings claims that 
pain sensitivity corresponds to higher ratings regarding the 
pain-relatedness of words, because both depend on the 
functioning of the same cognitive and neural mechanisms. 
Such an explanation is consistent with the embodied 
account of language, according to which the processing of 
linguistic meaning recruits areas of the brain dedicated to 
action, perception and emotion (Barsalou, 1999; Prinz, 
2005; Werning, 2012; Werning et al.,  2013). For example, 
understanding the meaning of a word like “syringe” is 
assumed to partially re-activate visual areas of the brain that 
are involved in perceiving syringes, motor areas that are 
relevant to the affordances of syringes, as well as emotional 
and pain-related circuits that encode affective states 
triggered by the interaction with syringes.  More specifically, 
the semantic processing of pain-related words will re-
activate the areas of the brain that are active when people 
actually experience pain (i.e., the pain matrix).  On this 
account, the relation between pain sensitivity and the 
evaluation of pain-related words is explained by assuming 
that individual differences in the activation of the pain 
matrix determine individual differences in pain sensitivity 
and thus differences in the processing of pain-related words. 
The first part of this hypothesis (individual differences in 
pain sensitivity are associated with stronger activation of the 
pain matrix) has been indeed confirmed in an fMRI study in 
which highly sensitive individuals exhibited more frequent 
and more robust pain-induced activation of the primary 
somatosensory cortex,  anterior cingulated cortex, and 
prefrontal cortex than did less sensitive individuals (Coghill 
et al., 2003). The second part of the hypothesis (individual 
differences in pain sensitivity determine differences in the 
processing of pain-related words) is an instance of the 
principle of body specificity (Casasanto, 2011), which 
claims that differences in bodily experiences will also lead 
to differences in the way in which concepts and word 
meanings are constructed.  According to the body specificity 
hypothesis, if concepts and word meanings are in part 
constituted by implicit simulations of actual actions, 
perceptions and emotions, then systematic differences in the 
way in which people act,  perceive and feel will also lead to 
differences in the way in which they construct concepts and 
word meanings. In this perspective, if the processing of 
pain-related words involves the re-activation of the brain 
regions that are active when people actually experience 
pain, then differences in activation as reflected by 
differences in pain sensititivity should also lead to 
differences in the processing of pain-related words. 
The body specificity hypothesis can then directly account 
for our results given that it predicts that individual 
differences in the way in which people experience painful 
stimuli (i.e., differences in pain sensitivity) will also lead to 
differences in the processing of pain-related words. 
Importantly,  the difference between concrete and abstract 
words in terms of their relation with pain-sensitivity can 
also be readily explained assuming such a theoretical 
framework. Whereas concrete concepts are processed in 
brain regions devoted to action, perception and emotions, 
the encoding and processing of abstract concepts may rely 
more strongly on linguistic information, thus activating 
brain areas that are involved in language processing, e.g., 
the left perisylvian network (see Binder et al. (2009)).  If so, 
we would in fact expect to find a correlation between pain 
sensitivity and the processing of concrete words given that 
they are assumed to depend on the activation of the same 
brain regions, while we do not have an apriori reason to 
expect a correlation also between pain sensitivity and the 
processing of abstract words given that the latter may 
depend on other brain areas.  It is interesting to note that 
more radical versions of the embodied theories are currently 
rejecting such a picture suggesting that abstract words entail 
affective processing and activate brain regions associated 
with emotion (i.e.,  the rostral anterior cingulate cortex 
which modulates activity in the amygdala; Vigliocco et al., 
2014). Our results,  however, do not support this more 
radical version of the embodied account and suggest that a 
moderate version of it could better fit our findings.3 
After having reviewed several theories that seem possible 
candidates to explain the results of this experiment, we can 
draw some final considerations. Both accounts of cognitive 
theories – processing biases and prototype theory - present 
some limitations. As for the first,  in spite of the increasing 
number of studies that have been focusing on the processing 
of pain-related information, the solidity of the association 
between processing biases and pain sensitivity, as well as 
the direction of the effect, are still highly questionable. 
Prototype theory,  on the other hand,  has shown to be able to 
account only partially for the presented evidence. Although 
the embodied account cannot be unequivocally supported by 
our experiment, it does seem to be the most promising 
account to accommodate our results. 
3 Somewhere in-between the theories that we have considered – cognitive biases, prototype theory, and the embodied account – it could be argued that the 
correlation between pain sensitivity and ratings on the pain-relatedness of words, is due to the intermediate effect of imagination. Highly sensitive people 
may be more prone than less sensitive individuals at imagining scenarios that are potentially associated with, or elicited by pain-related words, leading to 
higher pain-association values for these words. Given the effect of pain-incompatible imagery as a distractor of pain, it seems at least plausible that pain-
compatible imagery would have the opposite effect, enhancing the perceived pain-relatedness of words.
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Conclusion
In this study we investigated whether and how people’s pain 
sensitivity influences their associations of both abstract and 
concrete words with pain. Our results demonstrate that 
subjects with higher pain sensitivity are likely to associate 
words with greater amounts of pain than subjects with lower 
pain sensitivity. In order to adjudicate between alternative 
explanations,  we have discussed three different accounts. 
While theories of cognitive bias have severe limitations in 
their application to this study,  both, prototype theory and the 
embodied account of cognitive processing are well 
positioned to explicate the main results of our study. 
However, we have argued that differences in associations 
between abstract and concrete words are better accounted 
for by the embodied account. Future research will need to 
address a number of interesting and virtually unexplored 
open questions such as the relation between pain sensitivity 
and the cognitive representation of pain, and how 
motivational,  emotional, attentional factors contribute,  if 
they contribute at all, to determine people’s sensitivity to 
pain. The urgency of these questions is not only determined 
by their scientific value, but also by their potential practical 
implications. Given preliminary evidence that heightened 
pain sensitivity increases risk for future chronic pain 
conditions, answering these questions could also help 
identifying novel routes for preliminary diagnosis and 
treatment of this complex condition.
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